Sustainability: Are we short on science or on willpower?
by
Dr. Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz
First of all, I’d like to thank the organizers of
the “Weekend of Ideas” at the Manning Clark House for inviting
me to be part of this fascinating event. Of course, I cannot replace Bruce
Hobbs, who is a scientist involved in strategic planning of science at
the highest levels of politics. Myself, I am trained as a physicist and
a philosopher, doing research and not working on research policy; and
as such, I cannot speak about specific scientific programs or specific
political barriers concerning sustainability here in Australia. I have
been involved in some consulting: On behalf of the German Federal Ministery
of the Environment, our research group in Germany has been reflecting
about the concept of sustainability, or better: the concepts of sustainability
that are in the discussion now, from an ethical point of view; in this
context we were also asked to comment on the Sustainability of Nuclear
Power. Second, for the German Federal Ministery of Research we have tried
to figure out ways to better organize research on Sustainability and Global
Change – and some of that might be of interest here.
The organizers found some provocative headlines to each
of the session, basically in form of a question. Ours is: “Sustainability:
Are we short on science or willpower?”. Well, my answer would be:
Both, and Neither. The “both” side of the answer is somehow
evident, for there are lots of complex questions in the environmental
sciences, just think of climate change, and for there is empirical evidence
that people (and governments) do not act on their best insights when it
comes to the environment. Much of that seems to be commonplace to me.
So I decited to work out the “neither” side in my statement.
Short on Neither
A. So first: why aren’t we actually
so short on science after all? Well, let’s take climate change again.
This issue is enourmously complex, there is a lot of research going on,
but what did it really tell us new within the last five years or so? The
principal mechanism is clear (greenhouse warming), but there are just
that many other mechanisms that have to be considered and there is so
much uncertainty that comes with it, that despite of all the effort there
are still scientifically sound arguments for “climate sceptism”,
i.e., to deny that given the usual 2xCO2-Secenario, we will see any maleficient
climate change within the next 200 years or so, see for example Mr. Lindzen,
who is a top meteorologist of MIT. So: Scientists very rarely speak with
one voice on a given environmental problem. Second point: If one looks
at the major international research programs on environmental issues,
one can see a major shift from encouraging mainly natural sciences research
to encouraging social sciences and humanities research as well. It is
now well established that one needs this research to analyze environmental
challenges to humans. Social sciences are needed because any action or
change of behaviour may give rise to feedback processes not only in the
natural but also in the social environment. Moreover, there are crucial
interactions between the two systems (just think of environment and economy,
or of wars between states over regionally short resources, like water).
Humanities are needed as the attitudes towards the environment depends
strongly on cultural factors. Quite often we have the situation that people
are degrading the environment and know that they do so, but that they
do it for a certain reason (For a religious reason think of the funerals
and ritual washings in the river Ganges in India). We then have to refer
to the humanities to find out why a behaviour like that does nevertheless
makes sense to them. ((Like that, we can sometimes better understand phenomena
that look like shortages on willpower, but aren’t)). But
in Social Sciences and Humanities, experts do give competing explanations
and recommendations to an even larger extent. And now, as a decision maker,
we have also the clash of perspectives of these researchers: Shall we
follow environmental science, or cultural studies? That may be the reason
why there is also a second major shift in research funding, towards genuinely
integrated research programs and towards apt participation of
lay people to take local, pragmatic knowledge into account.
So, the full version of the science answer is: No, not
so much short on science, not even really short on social
sciences and humanities, but especially short on integrated research
and on apt participation procedures to attack socially and
politically relevant problems.
B. Now, how about willpower? Why maybe
not short on willpower? One part of the answer has already been given:
Some problems look like we are short on willpower, but on a closer
it is not that we are unwilling but that we just don’t know what
we should do (despite of all that science). The other part of the answer
is more radical. Maybe there is a problem not with the means, but with
the ends as well. The question given by the organizers does presuppose
that sustainability is a valid normative concept that should be attractive.
But maybe we should not take this for granted. That is what the rest of
my statement is about.
The term Sustainability (and also: Sustainable Development)
has become very popular since the Brundtland report to the UN in 1987:
“Our common future”. In this report, the authors state: “Sustainable
development meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs.” The main underlying
problem was at that time already pointed out by the famous paper “limits
to growth” of the Club of Rome in 1972. It is that when we go on
as we are, we will run out of natural resources. Better to say: There
will be no, or not enough, resources left for future generations. And
that might pose a problem of responsability for and of justice to these
generations. In short, to reach Sustainability means to stop living at
the costs of future generations. What does that mean and what does that
not mean?
a) It is an anthropocentric aim: Sustainability
does not mean preservation of nature for nature’s own sake –
to make this clear: On behalf of sustainability, it’s not that you
should not kill/“use” whales because they would then suffer
or things like that, it is because future generations might also want
to kill/“use” whales. And, at least on behalf of some concepts
of Sustainability, you ought to kill the whales, sell them, invest the
money and pass future generations the money, if the aggregate returns
are higher than the value increase of the whales when kept alive. Some
people wouldn’t think that that is ethically appropriate (cf. the
animal rights section of this w/e of ideas).
b) It means worrying about future generations, that
is: aiming at intergenerational justice (or solidarity), between
different generations, but not at intragenerational justice, that is justice
between people within one generation; think of the north/south issue,
development aid etc.: Again, some people wouldn’t think that worrying
only about future people is ethically appropriate.
We have to keep these two restrictions in mind, when
we want to understand why Sustainability may not be that appealing, especially
to “green” thinking people or to those who care about the
so called third world, about the poor or the like. And because within
the political arena, Sustainability competes with other terms that these
people might consider to be more appropriate, I can also understand their
political restraint towards Sustainability discourse.
So, these worries about Sustainability concern the appropriateness
of its central normative idea, that is of anthropocentric, intergenerational
justice. But I think that moreover, even if we concede these worries and
still want to spell out a concept of intergenerational justice (let’s
say, as one component of a broader concept of ethically sound behaviour
towards men and nature), the specific concepts of Sustainability that
are widespread now are not apt to do that. That brings me to my last and
perhaps most important point: To make this point, it will be necessary
to have a quick look at the more specific concepts of Sustainability that
there are at present. We can roughly distinguish three different types
here, aggregation accounts, rule-based accounts and indicator-based
accounts. I don’t have the time to go into much detail, I will
just very roughly sketch these accounts.
Aggregation Accounts
S1 The first type of aggregating concepts tries to build
directly upon the Brundtland definition, that was, securing the “ability
of future generations to meet their own needs”. Meeting needs is
understood as preference satisfaction. You might know these technical
terms from economics (esp. welfare economics) and/or politics. Economic
activities are projected into the future. Then a measure of overall preference
satisfaction is found either directly in some GDP or “net”/“green”
GDP integral over time. ((That means that we have to assign (or let the
market assign) prices also to every environmental good or service.)) Or,
it is found in some other overall utility, that is obtained using some
more elaborate axioms of how the key values of this projection (like income
and its distribution) affect preference satisfaction.
The justice-between-generations aspect is then taken
into account by saying: Well, this overall measure of how well needs are
met shall not decrease over time. That’s why this is called the
“Non-declining welfare criterion”. Or it is said that, within
a given time horizon, we shall maximize this measure. That can mean that
within time this measure decreases, so the notion of justice is a little
different here; but this notion might be known to you from utilitarian
ethics.
S2 The second type of aggregating concepts does not
aggregate over all activities, but tries to assign value to environmental
resources, i.e. determine the “environmental capital” (i.e.,
the physical basis of goods and services). Only these values are summed
up then, and only these values have to be kept constant, at least. In
a variant of this type, the environmental resources are to be kept constant
in physical units, not in value units.
One main problem with these two concepts is the following:
We want to spell out a concept of justice towards future generations with
an indefinite time horizon (!), and we assign values with respect to our
present, specific preferences and needs. We don’t know much about
future preferences, but I just don’t see the argument why we should
just take our preferences to be theirs, when we know that their preferences
will most likely be different. A Sustainability concept that does that
is simply overspecific. And together with that, it is also quite paternalistic,
because we take their preferences to be ours. Even if one takes projections
of preferences or probability distributions of preferences as a basis
of aggregation: I would still say that the concept of aggregation is overspecific,
at least for very long time horizons.
So: The “liberalistic” way of referring
to actual or projected preferences is problematic here: It wants to be
non-paternalistic, does not want to impose values on others. But in Sustainability,
we have to make assumptions about the values of future generations. And
doing it in a “liberalistic” tends to be overspecific and
thus paternalistic, or maybe better: more paternalistic than necessary.
Finally: This argument also applies to the the second
Sustainability concept mentioned, the resources one, because to consider
something as a resource does mean that it is a resource within some
process of production of goods and services, such that what you consider
to be a resource does depend on the possible uses you can make of it.
Rule-based accounts
So let’s have a look at the rule-based accounts.
S3 In rule-based accounts, there are typically between
three and five major rules that are specified and then indicators are
assigned to each rule. They are inspired more by ecology than be economy.
Nevertheless: The core of the rule-based accounts consists of one or more
rules that refer to the aggregation concepts just mentioned, quite often
they do refer to the variant of the second aggregation concept that says
one ought to preserve natural resources. This is then further specified:
renewable resources (like water) one is allowed to exploit to the point
of their recreation rate, while nonrenewable resources (like coal) one
either is not allowed to use at all (remember: Sustainability is a goal),
or, one is allowed to use only if there are renewable substitutes. But
there are also rule-based concepts that allow the exploitation of any
natural resource when it can be substituted by man-made capital. Sometimes
there are limits to that, sometimes not. To illustrate what that means:
Herman Daly, one of the key figures in the Sustainability discourse, called
those concepts that build heavily on substitution (which also includes
the majority of aggregation concepts) the Disneyland Concepts of Sustainability.
So in a way, the different concepts of aggregation show
up as resource rules here. That is why the same criticism applies to
them: they are also determining resources (and the possibilities of substitution)
with respect to our present production and consumption process. As soon
as you find a new possible use for some otherwise useless material, it
will become a resource, and as soon as you find a new possible use for
some resource, it may not be substitutable any more. You just don’t
know today, but you behave as if you would know exactly. But what we think
you should do is taking into account that you don’t know exactly.
OK, so let’s have a quick look at the other rules
of a rule-based concept. Because, whatever the resource rules might be
in particular, they are now just rules among other rules. These other
rules concern “sinks” (consider greenhouse warming: It is
the sink effect, the CO2 within the atmosphere, that sets the environmental
limits to the burning of charbon, not the availability of charbon itself).
They concern timescales of environmental change, i.e. that triggered transformations
of the environment shall not be too fast, and they concern so-called fatal
risks of mankind, that is life-threatening intoxication/irradiation of
significant parts of the world and the like.
These additional rules, I think, do not have the problem
of being too specific: Of course they can be spelled out only in terms
of actual or hypothetical threats known to us, and of course
future generations might find some technical solutions to these problems,
but ethically we cannot just suppose that they will, somehow, find some
solution, for this would mean to put them under pressure to find solutions
or to die/suffer.
One additional problem with rule-based accounts is that
there can be a conflict of having to break one or some of them to fulfill
the others (“conflict of rules”). While ultimately, in the
far future, when we live sustainable, this should no longer be the case,
it will quite often be the case in the meantime.
Indicators
Finally a very brief look at Indicator-based concepts.
They are used by the OECD, for instance. Basically, indicators are aggregates
that indicate a state, a pressure or a response. Of course, one can take
the aggregation accounts as indicator accounts with just one indicator
(which is a state indicator, by the way). And in fact, in most of the
concepts there is a “wealth” indicator that consists in the
first of the discussed aggregations, but then there are other indicators
as well like degree of air pollution, energy consumption per capita and
so forth.
The main problems with this kind of concept should already
be clear: First, the overspecification criticism applies. Second, there
is an equivalent to the conflict of rules, that is that decreasing one
indicator value might increase other ones. Finally, we have to have a
basis on which we can justify the selection of indicators and that allows
us to determine just how alarming a certain value of a certain indicator
is.
So we need an adequate ethical basis that is not overspecific,
but that is also not arbitrary, a basis that does point out relevant aspects
of human life that can be linked to resource use and all the other things
that are mentioned in the different rules or indicators. A basis, from
which we might even be able to discuss “conflict of rules”
cases, weight indicators against each other etc.
Just to remind you: Why not use the quantity of natural
resources left, or more in general: the state of the environment measured
in physical values: Because we do not value those resources as such. When
we take them as resources, they are resources for something,
they are of merely instrumental value, so one should try to develop the
Sustainability concept starting with that something. The same
argument does apply to “basic goods” (as John Rawls proposed,
in the context of his A Theory of Justice): Most of the proposed
goods (Life, health, also income and property, and the like) are not valued
as such, they are not ends-in-themselves, but as requirements
or means to do certain things we can value for themselves. ((I said most,
because there is also freedom on the list.)) Goods that are really basic
goods are defined as goods that everyone wants to have whatever
else he or she might strive for. They are considered to be general
means to whatever a specific purpose. So, by definition they are
means and not ends-in-themselves. Moreover: Basic goods are clearly not
overspecific. It’s merely the opposite, they tend to be too unspecific.
On the other hand: Why not just take satisfaction of
basic needs as the basis of Sustainability: Because we shouldn’t
(and often also cannot) make shure that their basic needs will be met
(somehow), but we should worry about the ability of future generations
to satisfy their own needs for themselves, such that it is up
to them to do it in the way they want to, or to be voluntarily unsatisfied
(for a certain time). This might not sound like much of a difference,
but it is the difference between being able to feed yourself and being
unable to do that and being fed by somebody else without being asked what
you like to eat, when you like to eat or whether you would prefer to live
for some days on a diet.
And there is a conceptual framework that might take
these caveats into account: It is the “capabilites”-concept
of Amartya Sen. It was introduced into the human development debate a
couple of years ago and might just be what we need for the Sustainability
debate as well: Sen proposed to look for basic human “functionings”
that consist in the fulfilment of basic needs, and tried to identify the
resp. basic “capabilities” that consist in being able to basically
“function” if you want. Together with Martha Nussbaum, he
worked out a basic sketch of a list of such capabilities, drawing on Aristotle’s
writings on the Good Life. It’s just amazing how little has changed
in writings on that subject over time, such that contemporary authors
say pretty much the same as Aristotle did, 2000 years ago. Of course,
in the context of Sustainability, such a list would maybe have to be extended
or shortened. But nevertheless, we would suggest to take it as a starting
point in the Sustainability debate as well, refine it, then rework the
rules etc. One idea of Sen was that it is not the job of an academic to
try to justify a precise and specific list. One can present such a list
as a suggestion, but the specification and validation should be as much
as possible up to the affected people itself. In the case of Sustainability,
this might be difficult or impossible. But, the present people are also
affected by Sustainability measures, so participatory procedures like
those that come with the Agenda 21 do make sense also under this aspect.
((And often they can produce the kind of local and pragmatic knowledge
that research cannot provide.)) – – The sustainable development
debate was, in the beginning, linked to the development debate. By putting
capabilities in the center, that link would become stronger again.
This way, a rather thin concept of Sustainability might
result. But this way, we can say that we do make best use of our knowledge
about certain constants of the human condition and thus we do care about
things that really make a difference to future generations. This concept
can also comprise aggregations, rules and indicators. So to a certain
extent it just helps us to interpret the existing concepts or components
of them and choose wisely between them. But, there will probably also
be some shifts in focus: Services will matter more than goods (think
of energy: it is now not so much to produce a certain amount of electricity
or heat, but to be able to live in comfortably temperatured rooms). And:
Institutions will become more important compared to physical stuff.
Like the institution of science, of state and law and the like.
Finally: Such a “less is more”-concept would
also make it easier to leave room for the otherwise far too often competing
claims of intragenerational justice, of animal rights/ecocentrism and
the like. And thus be maybe a little more attractive.
OK, the full version of the science answer was:
• We seem to be not so much short on science,
not even really short on social sciences and humanities, but
especially short on integrated research and on apt participation
procedures to attack socially and politically relevant problems.
And, to sum up the last part:
• Maybe we are not so much short on willpower,
but Sustainability is ethically convincing only as part of a
broader normative framework and because even as such a part, the concepts
that are developed so far typically have a core that is over-specific
and thus tend to be inapt and paternalistic.
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