| The linkages between
Australia’s population policy and issues
of environmental quality and resource depletion have been obscured during
the last 40 years by attempts at partial analysis and by a belief that
any negative impacts of population growth will always be solved by technological
innovation. In November 2002 the CSIRO Future Dilemmas study was released.
This examined high medium and low population scenarios out to 2050 and
distilled six important dilemmas which require solutions by the proponents
of different population options. The study concludes rather obviously
that population growth and rising per capita affluence will place increasing
pressure on issues of environmental quality and resource depletion.
In addition, artificial demarcations between population policy and environmental
policy are at best perverse, and at worst misleading. |
Science and the population debate
Science often promotes itself as distant, absolute and disinterested,
though in philosophical terms it is merely another stream of human endeavour
doing some things well (numbers and experiments) but often failing to understand
people, institutions and political forces. In order to study the effect of
Australia’s past
and future population levels, for a group of futures analysts at CSIRO Resource
Futures had to study almost everything. This included all the big ticket
items that modern societies require to keep economic growth moving, the market
optimistic and the consumer content.
To study the future options for different population sizes
in Australia, the
researchers constructed a model, known as The Australian Stocks and Flows
Framework (ASFF1). Within this model are layers of sub-calculators
which link humans and their lifestyles to the food, houses, cars and institutions
we each require in our daily lives, as well as to the exports the nation needs
to generate to pay for its imports from other countries.
What separates the ASFF from other national calculators is
that it represents the physical transactions underpinning the Australian economy.
Thus, houses are built of bricks, mortar, plastic, glass and aluminium rather
than merely being represented by the dollar value. When the flows of clay,
water and petrol are summed for each of the industries and the seven million
households that consume them, a picture emerges of how the nation functions
in a physical sense. The sets of numbers which the researchers simulated
into the future are presented as scenarios. Each scenario is driven by settings,
primarily immigration rates, that are required to
give different population outcomes. Nothing in the futures modelling remains
as we see it today. Technology evolves, consumer requirements change, people,
cars and houses all ‘die’ (and are replaced) and life keeps evolving.
Three population scenarios
This paper is constructed around a study of three population
scenarios to 2050 to assess the implications for resource use, environmental
quality and infrastructure needs.2 This
issue is a core research area for CSIRO Resource Futures. It is also of concern
to the Commonwealth Government which commissioned our program to undertake
a major study to examine environmental impacts of different levels of population
growth. This project has made a major contribution to our understanding and
we acknowledge this support. However the evaluation of the implications of
the study is our own, and does not reflect the views of the Commonwealth Government.
The central population scenario was intended to reflect a national
policy position that had been in place for the previous decade and was driven
by a net immigration rate of 70,000 persons per year. This is termed the
‘policy’ scenario in the following graphs. An environmental population scenario
(termed ‘deep green’) was driven by a net migration rate of zero persons per
year where the migration inflows equalled the outflows. A business perspective
was represented by a net migration rate of two thirds of one percent of the
total population each year (termed the ‘business’ scenario). All scenarios
implemented a total fertility rate of 1.74 in 2001 declining to 1.65 in 2011
and stabilising at that level. Life expectancy increased by one year for
every ten years of scenario simulation reaching 77 year for males, and 83
years for females by 2061.
By 2050, the policy scenario gave a stable population of around
25 million people, the deep green scenario 20 million and the business scenario
32 million (Figure 1). By the year 2100, the policy scenario was still around
25 million, the deep green scenario was 17 million and the business scenario
was 50 million. The evolution of each population sets in train a series of
physical requirements to meet the changing needs of each Australia. While
population numbers are the focus of the study, many changes take place at
the same time as motor cars improve and use less fuel, electricity plants
become more efficient, international inbound tourism keeps growing and the
nation’s export industries continue to expand. In general, the assumptions
behind the numbers are deliberately set to be optimistic and compatible with
a growing economic framework.3
Figure 1: Simulated total
population size in millions to the year 2100 for three population scenarios
Note: The three scenarios
are: the approximate policy position of 70,000 net immigration
per year (policy), an environmental position driven by zero net immigration
per year (deep green) and a business position driven by 0.67 per cent of current
population as net immigration per year (business).
This is the first time in Australia, and
almost any other advanced country, that a study of this complexity has been
undertaken. In order to shed some light on more important issues, six major
issues were distilled from the study and promoted as ‘dilemmas’ for national
decision makers. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a dilemma as ‘A
choice between two (or, loosely, several) alternatives, which are or appear
equally unfavourable’. The six dilemmas distilled were as follows:
For each dilemma, a number of options are possible. The key
insight from the study is that when the six issues are examined in detail,
it becomes clear that they are linked and changes in one may give a cascade
of effects throughout the physical economy. Thus, in seeking to lessen the
effect of population ageing by increasing the immigration rate (the business
scenario), the national greenhouse gas account expands
as the development driven by population growth (that is, greater consumption
and development) outpaces the infusion of improved technologies into the national
stock of infrastructure.
The ageing dilemma
The ageing dilemma is driven by the eternal quest for youth
and beauty. In a more serious vein, business interests are concerned that
under lower population scenarios, the workforce will decline, and Australia
will not have enough workers to drive an expanding economy nor
enough consumers to buy the goods and services produced by it. Government
interests are concerned by the cost of health and pension schemes, a core
message of the Government’s recently released Intergenerational Report.
Economic analyses by Melbourne University5 suggest that the ageing
issue is not as dire as it is sometimes portrayed and that if workers continue
to invest in superannuation, live healthy lives and are prepared to pay more
of their own medical expenses, then the Australian economy can continue operating
reasonably well. Western European countries are generally more advanced in
their population ageing process, and while they face the same type of challenges
in pensions and healthcare, there is more emphasis placed on retraining older
workers for new opportunities in the workforce, and exploring institutional
changes that enable childrearing and employment to amicably co-exist.
Simulated proportions (percentage) of people
to 2100 who will be over 65 years of age for three population scenarios. The
analyses carried out for this report showed that different population scenarios
had a substantial influence on the ageing profile of the nation (Figure 2).
Both the policy and deep green scenarios gave ageing profiles (proportion
of population over 65 years of age) that approached one in four or even one
in three. By contrast, the business scenario gave an ageing profile that
stabilised at around one in five, out beyond 2050. This seemed to be in conflict
with previous analyses of immigration and ageing but examination of published
data revealed good agreement.6 This one
in five ratio results in a more resilient pension and health care funding
situation according to many labour market experts. However there are also
many implications for resource use and environmental quality in reaching the
one-in-five ratio by using immigration as a way to compensate for Australia’s declining
birth rates. The options for higher or lower ageing ratios (and their economic
and social implications) thus set up the first of the future population dilemmas
within which Australia may have to make some definite decisions.
Figure 2: Simulated proportions
(percentage) of people to 2100 who will be over 65 years of age for three
population scenarios
Note: For a description
of the three scenarios, see Figure 1
The international trade dilemma
Good trading performances in the international arena provide
key performance indicators for Government ministers and their business leaders.
Trade brings good fortune to many Australian companies, their workers and
their shareholders, but trade policies are frequently decoupled from population
policies — apart from the assumption that more trade is better. The schema
shown in Figure 3 describes how population size can be linked to trade and
international debt issues mainly through the lifestyle choices of individuals.
Direct requirements for food and water (the primary or first order population
effect) are frequently the focus of population analyses. However, when the
indirect requirements of a population for lifestyle (second order), imports
of consumer goods (third order) and finance to pay for development and imports
(fourth order) are included, population policy becomes more complex and linked
to key issues such as Australia’s long-term financial resilience and its competitiveness
in international trade.
Figure 3: A representation
of the four levels of population influence from the primary, or first order, influence to the more diffuse quaternary
or fourth order effect.
This analysis showed that higher rates of population growth
(the business scenario) gave smaller balances of physical trade than lower
rates of population growth (the policy and deep green scenarios). The two
main drivers of the result were that larger populations consume more of what
might have been exported; they also require more imports, since higher numbers
of younger people form more households, require more houses, cars, consumer
goods and other items not currently produced in Australia.
Scenarios are different to predictions and trends could change
in many sectors, thus rendering the underlying assumptions incorrect. A nation
with a higher population might bring with it the scale and skills that transform
it fully into a service economy with little reliance on the traditional commodity
sectors. However, the nation’s industrial and exporting infrastructure represents
an investment over many decades with substantial resistance to change. If
it is to change radically by 2020, then the revolution in economic structure
to force the change, should probably begin tomorrow.
Larger populations drive substantial domestic requirements
but that does not always translate to positive outcomes in international trade
terms. Smaller countries such as Switzerland (7m), Norway (4m),
Finland (5m) and Singapore (4m) generally maintain an international trading account in surplus. Larger and
growing countries such as Australia (19.7m), Canada (31m)
and USA (276m)
generally run negative trading accounts and remain indebted to the international
lending community. It is too simplistic to argue that small is better, as
it is to argue the opposite. The key focus for Australia is that
three quarters of its trade is driven by physical transactions, which produce
follow-on effects to the other population dilemmas.
The physical flow dilemma
The trade dilemma cascades on to the ‘physical flow dilemma’.
Underlying the financial flows in Australia’s economy,
are substantial flows of materials. Currently, the Australian economy is
characterised by large flows of materials requiring the movement of 200 tonnes
per person per year7 (excluding water and atmospheric gases) (Figure
4). Simulating the population scenarios with the same export
and trade objectives results in a relatively constant total material flow
diluted by the higher population numbers in the business scenario.
Thus in the absence of changes in trade policy, the deep green population
scenario gives higher material flows on a per capita basis. This parallels
analyses that focus on higher per capita GDP as an attractive outcome from
lower rates of population growth.
In practical terms it is possible that per capita material
flows will become, in ten years time, one of the main indicators (similar
to GDP growth rate) by which investment rating agencies and global traders
will decide whether a country has a reasonable investment risk, and whether
its currency is worth purchasing. This anticipation is based on the development
of material flow accounting in many national statistical agencies and concepts
of national metabolism that are attracting policy interest.8 In
comparison with other countries (Figure 4) Australia, by historical precedent
as well as current decision making, is intent on maintaining a strong physical
economy. This course does not match the ‘light, dry’ e-commerce economy,
the praises of which are frequently lauded in the business pages of the national
broadsheets.
Figure
4: Total material flow in tonnes per person per year for three population
scenarios.
Note: For a description
of the three scenarios, see Figure 1
There is an advantage in remaining a physical economy, provided
that the trade dilemma compensates and more dollars are earned for each tonne
of physical export. Such an outcome could provide the investment required
to restore the agricultural heartlands and to refurbish the structure and
function of our cities. Alternatively, reducing per capita imports (part
of the trade dilemma) could alleviate the pressure on Australia’s export
income sectors to achieve an economic balance.
The greenhouse gas dilemma
The international trade and physical flow dilemmas feed through
to the greenhouse gas dilemma. For every tonne of grain grown, mining overburden
removed and coal exported, fossil fuel is combusted to drive the machines
and run the processing facilities. When the electricity for houses and the
petrol for cars is added, it can be seen how population
growth drives greenhouse gas emissions directly through population size, and
indirectly through affluence and trading activities.
The greenhouse gas dilemma portrayed in Figure 5 shows carbon
dioxide emissions ranked in order of population size to 2050. Even for the
deep green scenario, where the population number is declining, carbon dioxide
emissions track well away from the 1990 levels which were used to benchmark
each country for the international Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Export industries,
inbound international tourism and growing domestic affluence are the key components
of the growing gap between the 1990 benchmark and the deep green scenario.
Figure 5: Simulated carbon
dioxide emissions in million tonnes per year from the energy sector to 2050,
for three population scenarios
Note: For a description
of the three scenarios, see Figure 1
The linkages between the dilemmas now start to cross over and
compound. The business scenario results in a good outcome for the ageing
dilemma (a younger population), a good outcome for the material flow dilemma
(a smaller per capita flow), a poorer outcome for the physical trade dilemma (a lower trade
balance) and a poorer outcome for the greenhouse gas dilemma (a doubling of
emissions relative to the base year of 1990). Even the deep green population
position tracks well above benchmark levels. Meeting those benchmark levels
would require that international trade and inbound tourism be vastly restructured
and per capita affluence capped or reduced. Technology alone will have little
effect since most current technologies improve their process efficiencies
by 50 to 100 per cent during the duration of the scenario. In summary, Figure
5 depicts the challenge faced by government institutions such as the Australian
Greenhouse Office, in achieving any real progress in the task of reducing
greenhouse emissions, given the current structure and function of the Australian
economy.
The resource use dilemma
Many environmental pessimists have ended up on the rocks of
the population debate by foretelling the end of the world when society eventually
runs out of raw materials. Generally, the analyses outlined here have used
optimistic assumptions9 about the current status of resource stocks.
New developments are included in future scenarios based on expert knowledge.
However, in spite of the optimism, the scenarios highlighted concern for three
resource areas: the loss of agricultural land, the decline of marine fish
stocks and the depletion in domestic reserves of oil and gas. While many
materials can substitute for each other, high quality energy resources such
as oil and gas are the life-blood of a modern economy and cannot be easily
substituted in the short term. The petroleum depletion issue is thus linked
to the external trade dilemma. We assume that oil imports are available in
the medium term to 2020 if only to avoid contradicting the commonly accepted
policy adage that ‘as oil prices rise, then more oil resources will be found’.
Beyond 2020 this assumption becomes somewhat heroic. Australia
needs to actively consider a number of transitional possibilities for its transport
fuels and its transport technologies.10
Figure 6: Simulated domestic
production of oil and condensate to 2050 for all population scenarios and
simulated needs under the policy, deep green and business scenarios
The simulations show that local production from domestic oil
stocks could be approaching a plateau and could start to decline past 2015
(Figure 6). The oil requirements continue to grow under all population scenarios
in spite of advanced engine technologies penetrating throughout the vehicle
fleet. The presence of many other sectors not linked to domestic population,
such as export freight and international inbound tourism, explains why even
the declining population in the deep green scenarios does not stabilise its
requirement for oil. By 2020, the oil deficit in trade terms could be 20
million tonnes or A$ 7 billion if the international oil price stays at US$25 per
barrel. By 2050 the trade deficit could be 60 million tonnes or A$ 20
billion.
There is no doubt that new transport fuels will replace oil
and the most obvious for Australia, in view
of the vast natural gas reserves on the North West Shelf and in the Timor
Gap, is liquefied natural gas (LNG). Current long-term export contracts for
LNG could see future Australian domestic requirements for transport fuels
squeezed between international agreements and a declining domestic resource
base. Whether it is better to have the export income now, or leave the reserves
in the ground for the next two human generations is a discussion worth having
within the context of the population debate. It is possible that these results
are a little optimistic given that fuel efficiency in the motor vehicle fleet
has not changed appreciably in the last three decades, due to a consumer preference
for power and opulence, as well as the shift to sports utility vehicles.
The environmental quality dilemma
Three environmental quality issues were highlighted in the
study: water quality, bio-diversity quality and air quality in the airsheds of capital cities. The water and bio-diversity quality
issues are driven mainly by export trade, the third order population influence
(refer Figure 3). Air quality in cities, simulated here mainly as the combustion
products of motor cars, trucks and buses, is directly
related to population size, affluence levels and driving preferences. For
nitrous oxide emissions in the Sydney airshed11
the levels stabilise for the deep green scenario around 2015 and for the policy
scenario around 2040 but grow linearly for the business scenario (Figure 7).
These could be considered worst-case scenarios and, with citizens attuned
to air pollution as a key environmental variable in their city, political
forces may facilitate change. Technological change assumptions for vehicle
motors are optimistic but behavioural changes such as reducing car ownership
and driving fewer kilometres per year are not included. Neither is a modal
shift to rail and bus transport considered since current investment patterns
continue to favour highways and cars.
Figure 7: The simulated
production of nitrous oxides (in thousands of tonnes per year from
fuel combustion for all vehicles in the Sydney airshed
to 2050 for the three population scenarios
Considering the motor car fleet and associated transport emissions
from this sector of national infrastructure, technological change promises
vast improvements if institutions encourage or force a change in consumer
preference. CSIRO researchers in collaboration with Australian manufacturers
have already produced hybrid cars (with a small traditional engine driving
electric motors on each wheel). Hybrid motors halve fuel consumption and
therefore emissions. The subsequent vehicle technology after 2015 will be
‘hypercars’ driven by methanol fuel cells emitting
only carbon dioxide and water vapour within the city airshed.
Although Australian designs for hybrid cars have not been taken up, seemingly
due to indifference from manufacturers and the public alike, the motor vehicle
industry is aided by government grants, export incentives, salary packaging
opportunities and fleet leasing companies. With this support, a solution
may be found to lessen the load that Australian lungs are expected to process
as a by-product of the transport system we have chosen.
Conclusions
The distillation of the six dilemmas from the three population
scenarios does not underpin a recommendation on what Australia’s future
population might be, or should be. The six dilemmas provide a framework for
further discussion that could move the population debate past population ageing,
composition of the immigration intake and border defence. Yet there are mid-level
conclusions from the study that can inform immediate population issues and
policy design. Ten such conclusions from the study are as follows:
-
The direct effects of population growth are obvious
and the more people there are in Australia, the
more resources will be used and the more waste and pollution will be generated.
Given that, the three population scenarios tested are all physically feasible12
out to 2050. Most resource and environmental issues are manageable but quick
solutions are generally scarce.
-
Population growth has positive effects for economic
measures of progress13 such as gross domestic product, total consumption
and stimulus to the housing and other industries. Even under the deep green
scenario, moderate economic growth continues in most sectors for the next
20 years.
-
The immigration rates that drive the population
scenarios propel three quite different visions of Australia by 2050.
The critical differences provide unique advantages and disadvantages for each
scenario.14
-
Given the focus on Australia’s physical
economy, technological innovation15 alone is not enough to resolve
the resource and environmental issues caused by continuing population and
economic growth.
-
The national population debate could be enriched
and enlivened by including indirect effects of population as well as direct
effects.16 The researchers propose three levels of indirect effect
that cover affluence (second order), international trade (third order) and
international debt (fourth order).
-
Three immediate resource and environmental issues
of concern are linked directly to population size. These are the resilience
of stocks of Australia’s marine fish, the next source of transport fuels as domestic oil reserves run down
over the next 20 years and the air quality of the airsheds
that surround Australia’s capital
cities.17
-
Australia’s governing institutions (public and private) should focus on stock issues18 rather than flow issues. Stock issues
are long-term ones referring to the size, quality, health and location of
people, infrastructure and natural resources. The shorter-term flows (the
day to day issues) can best be left to the speed and versatility of market
mechanisms.
-
The key challenges of the ‘deep green’ position19
on population relate to the ageing profile eventually developed under this
scenario, how Australia would retain its connectedness, healthy regional economies
and the possibility of population decline past the year 2100, which may be
difficult to reverse and which could be terminal.
-
In spite of achieving population stability20
in the ‘policy’ scenario, resource use and environmental quality issues become
increasingly important due to assumptions of continued expansion in domestic
affluence and physical trade. While many of the key assumptions in this scenario
are shared with the deep green and business scenarios, the key challenge here
is to develop new ways of thinking about how the nation should be managed,
rather than assuming that its future is related to its past.
-
The greatest challenge to the business scenario
is the large and continuing expansion of material and energy requirements
and the subsequent effects of resource depletion and waste generation. To
overcome these problems will require a revolutionary change in the physical
processing core21 of Australian industry as well as the attitudes
and requirements of Australian consumers.
How should Australia conduct the real population debate?
This analysis points to five issues that could be introduced
more explicitly into the next round of debates on population numbers, fertility
rates, immigration levels, workplace skills and structural change in the economy.
The first issue is that the individual Australian consumer
is the driver of Australia’s economic
metabolism and the receiver of most, if not all, of its goods and services
in some form or other. Adam Smith, the father of modern economics, said this
more than 200 years ago and his words have never been truer. Thus, the positives
and negatives shown in these charts of possible futures cannot be avoided
by the individual consumer. It will require bottom-up actions by a collective
of individual consumers22 as well as top-down leadership and institutional
change by politicians, lobbyists and bureaucrats to effectively resolve the
set of issues presented by the six population dilemmas.
The second issue is the acceptance of linkages over long time
scales throughout Australia’s social,
economic and physical systems. Commentators and senior bureaucrats tend to
focus on the immediate minutiae of a problem and short-term issue management.
It is generally expected that the knock-on effects of a proposed doubling,
or halving, of Australia’s population
size by 2050 will be remedied by technological innovation or by policy incentives
and pricing mechanisms. These decisions are seldom evaluated over the periods
of 25 – 50 years during which they play out.
The third issue is the recognition of the inertia in most infrastructure
and institutional systems. The motor car fleet turns over every 20 years
or so. Period housing designs in attractive suburbs can last 100 years or
more. Any significant change in Australia’s constitution
may take centuries, if attempts to loosen our ties to the English monarchy
provide any guidance. Inertia is the most powerful brake on innovation.
The fourth issue is an examination of the physical effects
of continually expanding Australia’s globalised trade flows in order to pay for consumer imports
and interest payments on the country’s international debt. When a full analysis
was recently undertaken of New Zealand’s tourism
industry,23 nearly one quarter of national
energy and greenhouse gas emissions were related to tourism activities, much
of it to international tourism. Similarly, while many export industries in
Australia bring in good dollar returns, the profits are seldom enough to repair the indirect
effect of production.
The fifth issue to include is that of limits. Australians
are beginning to accept that the country’s ageing population might limit national
economic productivity due to workforce size and composition.24
In the resource and environmental sectors, this research concludes
that domestic oil resources may be effectively run dry by 2020 and that many
of the country’s marine fisheries are already on the edge. The oil and fish
that we require can always be imported or other resources substituted for
them. In aggregate though, if imports grow too high, the international monetary
system may correct us, the dollar may devalue substantially, and international
debt levels may become difficult to service. Eventually many of the physical
limits perceived in the analyses may translate through into economic and social
constraints. Since humans are a long-lived species, the national population
debate cannot ignore the possibility that many limits may cascade and link.
Between a rock and a hard place?
Until the national population debate focuses on the six linked
dilemmas as an interacting set, then national population
policy will remain at the beck and call of marginal policy decisions and of
lobbyists promoting their own causes. Lower rates of population growth could
produce better environmental outcomes and a more advanced ageing profile.
Higher rates of population growth could produce the opposite. Somewhere in
the dimensions of the six dilemmas is a space that gives reasonable outcomes
for society, the economy and the environment. However, society has to help
design that space. It could reduce the complexity of the interactions by
constraining issues such as ‘what ageing profile?’, ‘what level of greenhouse
emissions?’ and ‘what decline in environmental quality?’.
Technology alone will not moderate the environmental outcomes
of whatever population size unless in parallel there is a substantial reduction
in the material and energy content of the daily lifestyles of each and every
Australian. This does not mean that life gets gloomier or greyer, but it
may have to change. Pursuing a policy of ‘business as usual’, inevitably
tracks the nation down the average policy scenario where many environmental
outcomes25 and social outcomes26 are below the standard
expected of a developed economy.
In resource and environmental terms, Australia could
do better if it chanced its arm a little and started to live the iconic slogans
of its sporting heroes such as ‘no pain, no gain’. Until the nation practices
this philosophy, population-environment policy may remain floating in policy
space, somewhere between a rock and a hard place.
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by a research contract
from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
and project funding from CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems. More than 300 experts
from all walks of life contributed to initial workshops, subsequent discussions
and the peer review processes.
References
-
B. Foran and F. Poldy,
‘Modelling physical realities: Designing and testing future options to 2050
and beyond’, in. J. Venning and J. Higgins, Eds,
Towards Sustainability: Emerging Systems for Informing Sustainable Development,
University of New South Wales Press, 2001, pp. 165 – 195
-
Published as B. Foran and F. Poldy,
Future Dilemmas: Options to 2050 for Australia’s Population, Technology, Resources
and Environment, a report to The Department of Immigration and Multicultural
and Indigenous Affairs, October 2002, 336 pp. http://www.cse.csiro.au/research/program5/futuredilemmas/index.htm#accessing
accessed 5/2/2003. A shorter version written for the lay reader, I called
Dilemmas Distilled, can also be obtained from the same web page.
-
Many of the assumptions for the scenarios were derived from a series of 16
expert workshops conducted at the start of the research. J. Conroy, B. Foran, F. Poldy and T. Quinnell, ‘Future Options to 2050: DIMA Workshop Report’,
CSIRO Resource Futures Working Document Series 00/03 http://www.cse.csiro.au/research/program5/nationalfutures/wds2000.htm
accessed 5/2/2003. In addition a synthesis of the assumptions is
provided in the main report in Appendix 1, pp. 282 – 321. 4
-
Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Budget Paper No. 5:
The Integenerational Report’, Budget 2002 – 03,
http://www.budget.gov.au/2002-03/bp5/html/01_BP5Prelim.html
accessed 5/2/2003
-
R. Guest and I.M. McDonald, ‘Prospective demographic change and Australia’s
living standards in 2050', People and Place, vol. 10, no. 2, pp 6 – 15
-
P. McDonald and R. Kippen, ‘Population projections for Australia’, Business Council
of Australia Papers, vol. 2, no. 2, 2000 pp. 96 – 104, Business Council of
Australia, Melbourne.
-
The indicator of material flow per capita has been developed in the field
of material flow analysis and is being used as a whole-economy indicator for
environmental analysis Europe. That Australia currently moves 200 tonnes
per capita per year, does not suggest that all of this is environmentally
damaging. Some of this relates to mining operations where sites are rehabilitated
as well as farming practices and urban development. It does however classify
the current economic structure as a materially intensive one. Whether
Australia’s best interests in the
long term are well served by continuing on this track should be a continuing
subject for national debate, especially when combined with the continuing
deficit in the external trade balance.
-
S. Bringezu and H. Schutz, ‘Total material Resource
Flows of the United Kingdom’, A Wuppertal Institute Contract Report for the UK Department
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Contract Reference No. DETR EPG 1/8/62, #0 May 2001,
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/des/waste/research/mfa/mfaressum.pdf
accessed 5/2/2003
-
See Foran and Poldy (main report), op. cit., pp. 119 – 125.
-
These issues are discussed in ibid., pp. 119 – 122, 170 – 173 and 235 – 236. In addition
other work is exploring the transition to a methanol- from- wood transport
fuels system under a research contract from Land and Water
Australia. Early analyses have
been published as B. Foran and D. Crane, ‘Testing the feasibility of biomass based
transport fuels and electricity generation in Australia’, Australian Journal
of Environmental Management, vol. 9 no. 2, June 2002, pp. 44 – 55.
-
The year 2000 State of Environment Report produced by the Environmental
Protection Agency of New South Wales notes that ‘underlying NOx emissions continue to rise’.
http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/soe/soe2000/ca/ca_3.4.htm#ca_3.4_ind_3.9, accessed
5/2/2003.
-
The ‘feasibility’ referred to in this conclusion is termed a physical feasibility.
The terms of reference of the study and the modelling methods used deliberately
excluded direct analysis of social and economic issues, although many provided
context and comment for the physical analysis. There was considerable disquiet
in some population lobby circles that CSIRO did not promote issues such as
water and agricultural soils more strongly. The analytical outcomes found
that many of the issues were indeed severe but that, with the 50 – 100 year
time frame of the analysis, there was considerable scope for a revolution.
Whether Australia is sufficiently prepared
for that revolution is another debate.
-
This comment acknowledges that population growth is central to economic growth.
In fact nearly 50 per cent of GDP growth can be attributable to population
increase. In an economic system where success is measured by GDP growth rate,
this means slowing population growth will slow GDP growth. The biggest medium
term challenge for developed economies is to restructure their systems and
their measures of achievement to make this linkage to population growth optional,
rather than obligatory.
-
The final ‘conclusions’ chapter of the report was deleted during the penultimate
stage of peer review and policy vetting. In this chapter, a comprehensive
debrief of each population scenario was attempted. That it produced discomfort
in policy circles was obvious. However the authors did not have the opportunity
to distil the reasons for the discomfort other than there were passages that
were ‘economically and socially naïve’. In the pragmatic world of policy
analysis, it was judged better to publish 90 per cent of the report, rather
than have it go through another year or more of homogenisation.
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There are two issues here. Many useful technologies such as hybrid motor
vehicles could halve city air emission and petrol consumption. However unless
every new vehicle meets this technological standard, the inertia of the stock
effect dominates. Thus it may take 30 – 50 years to achieve the desired resource
and environmental outcome. Better technologies usually stimulate the inter-sectoral
rebound effect where physical savings translate to financial savings that
then stimulate other resource using sectors of the economy. Promised savings
from efficiencies are therefore not achieved.
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In some ways this figure is an elaboration of the I=PAT
equation first promoted by Barry Commoner and Paul Ehrlich in the 1970s.
The additional nuance is the addition of the drivers of international trade
and international debt which was based on our modelling and accounting methodology.
Australia appears to be relying
more on its physical economy to balance its international trading accounts
that its brain economy. This can increase the reliance on agriculture, mining
and basic manufacturing as the main source of exports to pay for our imports.
While inbound international tourism is often seen as a service industry, a
full life cycle accounting of the sector reveals that it relies on a myriad
of energy and material transactions to reap the dollar harvest.
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In the early stages of the study, the linking of population size to domestic
oil reserves met the cornucopian challenge that ‘as the price of oil rises
so we will find more oil’. While this is possible, recent government studies,
petroleum industry bodies and stock market reports suggest that a growing
gap between domestic requirements and domestic supplies looks possible past
the year 2015.
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The good demographic detail that underpins the population debate is required
for every major physical sector if Australia intends to make the difficult
but strategic transition towards sustainability. With notable exceptions,
the data sources on stocks are sparse, spread across many institutions and
poorly cared for. Many modern economies are in a similar situation. See Foran and Poldy, op. cit.,
pp. 76 – 86 for a deeper discussion on building stocks.
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Stopping population growth does not halt Australia’s resource and environmental
problems, but it does avoid making them worse. The accelerated ageing profile
of the low population scenario is the ‘single issue’ debating point used by
the current proponents of higher rates of population growth to underpin their
position. The Future Dilemmas report briefly discusses (pp. 219 – 223) whether
the difficulties of population ageing as a policy issue, is real or ethereal.
The core issue is the link between population growth and economic growth.
Until the nation implements an economic structure that has alternative options
for maintaining economic growth, then the low population growth lobby could
remain isolated on the margin of the population debate.
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Many criticisms of the Future Dilemmas report have noted that the ‘policy
scenario’ as implemented is not currently, and has seldom been, the real policy
situation. Policy press releases over the past six or so years have seen
a degree of bracket creep in the population size that will eventually be achieved
with the demographic inputs of birth rates, death rates and immigration rates.
The 2050 population values implicit in the policy settings have gradually
crept from 23 to 25 and then to 28 million. There were disagreements between
the CSIRO population modelling and that undertaken for policy purposes. This
is discussed in Appendix 2 of the report, pp. 322 – 336
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A frequent policy response to the challenges of the high population growth
scenario is to ‘put them all in buildings just like Singapore,
Hong Kong and Shanghai’. This approach helps
solve the urban sprawl problem, but does not deal with the myriad of unseen
and distant physical transactions that underpin daily lifestyle and yearly
economic growth rate. This issue is covered in the material flow account
in the Future Dilemmas report, pp. 228 – 232
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Analyses recently completed by Manfred Lenzen, Christopher Dey (Department
of Physics, University of Sydney and Barney Foran show that in a full life cycle analysis of personal
consumption, the total energy used is directly related to the yearly monetary
expenditure on a per capita basis. As expenditure rises, then so too does the direct and indirect (through
the full production chain) use of fossil energy and therefore greenhouse gas
emissions. This is true also for water use and land disturbance.
Without substantial change in the nature of household consumption, economic
growth and rising affluence will continue to place increasing pressure on
the environmental sectors even under low rates of population growth. Solving
this issue in a timely and equitable manner is the biggest challenge facing
both economists and environmentalists. See Figures 5.14 (p. 179) and 6.1
(p. 199) in the Future Dilemmas report.
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M.G. Patterson and G. McDonald, How Clean and Green is
New Zealand Tourism? Lifecycle and Future Environmental Impacts, Manaaki
Press, Lincoln, New Zealand, 2003
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‘Ageing nation will need to keep working’, Sydney Morning Herald, Monday 21st January 2002,
http://old.smh.com.au/news/0201/21/national/national13.html
accessed 5/2/2003
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Australian State of the Environment Committee, Australian State of the Environment
2001, Independent Report to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment
and Heritage, CSIRO Publishing, 2003. http://www.ea.gov.au/soe/2001/contents.html#download
accessed 5/2/2003.
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The Australian Collaboration, ‘A Just and Sustainable Australia and Where
Are We Going’, The Trust For Young Australians, December
2001, http://www.tya.org.au/australiancollaboration/reports.htm#Just
accessed 5/2/2003.
