Citizenship

 

• In Australia and internationally, the term “citizenship” is used widely today without sufficient critical reflection. It is assumed to have a high normative value. It is taken to mean, or refer to, qualities or attributes of “civic virtue” and socially responsibility. It is assumed to be valuable, even noble. It is taken to represent a common bond with others.

 

• Recent government initiatives have reflected this view. The new citizenship test for those applying for naturalization incorporates an assumption that “good” attitudes, shared values and a common cultural knowledge go hand in hand with “good” citizenship.

 

This is highly problematic. Among the many problems associated with the normative discourse of citizenship are:

 

• The fact that citizenship is defined not by values, but by law. It is a narrow, strict and inflexible definition that, in itself, has no relationship to values, or to a commitment to Australia. Citizenship by law – except where it is acquired by naturalization - is either conferred or refused without any regard to behaviour or to sense of belonging or attachment to Australia. This approach has been confirmed on several recent occasions by the High Court.

 

• The fact that anti-social, even socially destructive behaviour is committed by persons regardless of their citizenship status. (This was one of the most worrying aspects of the terrorist attacks in London, in 2006). The idea that citizenship equates with virtue is naïve. In short, citizens can be bad. And conversely, non-citizens, or aliens, can be “good citizens” in the normative sense.

 

• The normative use of the term “citizen”, however, invites the opposite conclusion. It suggests that “citizen” is a term of general, non-specific reference. Instead, the term is exclusive. It excludes non-citizens, and suggests that “aliens” are a suspect class of person. It implies a division between desirable and undesirable types of person – an implication that is legally unfounded, as well as conceptually false.

 

• The normative use of the term “citizen” suggests also that certain entitlements, even rights, are enjoyed by citizens (either as a type of reward, or as an aspect of the definition of citizenship). This is empirically inaccurate – almost all of the “rights” one might consider to belong, by definition, to citizens, are qualified and/or conditional. Many obligations or responsibilities are similarly qualified. Moreover, many “citizenship” rights, responsibilities and obligations are also enjoyed by or owed by non-citizen residents.

 

• Genuine problems exist in individual countries and in the world for which the discourse of “citizenship” is a (misguided) response. These are problems associated with rapid demographic change, the challenges of balancing pluralism and integration, the advent of large-scale refugee populations, and threats caused by fundamentalist and extremist individuals.

 

Rather than assisting with a solution to these problems, the normative discourse of citizenship may exacerbate them.

 

·      It may increase alienation among residents who are not legal citizens.

·      It may undermine efforts to support and value pluralism.

·      It may distract from the search for other forms of integration, and the identification of other ways in which the civic or social bond may be encouraged.

·      It may deflect from attention to human rights, and the human needs of all persons, regardless of citizenship.

 

Nevertheless, legal citizenship remains important. The goal of a national population in which the large majority are legal citizens should not be set aside. The need for social cohesion and commitment to key institutional values should also be addressed.

 

In conclusion, I make suggestions as to how these goals might be addressed.